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ABSTRACT
Security services and mechanisms in wireless networks have long been studied
and developed. However, compared to upper network layers, physical layer security
did not play a significant role in the OSI security model. Thanks to the easier imple-
mentation and verification methods brought by the development of software defined
radio (SDR) techniques, physical layer security mechanisms have recently drawn in-
creasing interest from researchers. Digital watermarking is one of the popular security
techniques that can fully utilize various exclusive characteristics of the physical layer.
This thesis proposes a physical layer watermarking technique named Water-
marked Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) or WDSSS technique, which em-
beds authentication information into pseudonoise (PN) sequences of a DSSS system.
The design and implementation of the WDSSS prototype system on the GNU Ra-
dio/USRP SDR platform is discussed, as well as two watermark embedding methods,
the maximized minimum distance method and the sub-sequence method. Theoreti-
cal analysis and experimental results on the WDSSS prototype system are presented
to evaluate the performances of both the content signal and the watermark signal.
Results show that, for the 11-chip PN sequence, increasing artificial chip errors has a
v
quantitatively predictable impact on the content signal, requiring 2 dB higher signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) to maintain an acceptable packet error rate (PER) for one ad-
ditional flipped chip. In terms of the watermark signal, the two embedding methods
demonstrated individual advantages in either PER or throughput. The maximized
minimum distance method outperforms the sub-sequence embedding method with a
3 dB lower SNR requirement, while the latter provides 400% more throughput than
the former with adequate SNR.
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Wireless networks provide an extension upon wired networks due to their
open communication environment. Wireless network connections facilitate informa-
tion sharing, however, they also cause concerns about the privacy and security of
communication contents. Therefore, security mechanisms to defeat hostile attacks
in wireless networks have been explored in depth and breadth ever since wireless
networks emerged. As defined in the ITU-T Recommendation X.800 [27], Security
Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), various security services are
distributed across all layers to provide systematic protection. However, in this secu-
rity model, the physical layer does not play an important role because the design of
the model intended to minimize the duplication of services among layers, as shown
in Table I.
Along with the growth of wireless communication systems, demands on the
power efficiency of mobile devices have increased. There is also an increasing need for
1
Service
Layer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Peer entity authentication . . Y Y . . Y
Data origin authentication . . Y Y . . Y
Access control service . . Y Y . . Y
Connection confidentiality Y Y Y Y . Y Y
Connectionless confidentiality . Y Y Y . Y Y
Selective field confidentiality . . . . . Y Y
Traffic flow confidentiality Y . Y . . . Y
Connection Integrity with recovery . . . Y . . Y
Connection integrity without recovery . . Y Y . . Y
Selective field connection integrity . . . . . . Y
Connectionless integrity . . Y Y . . Y
Selective field connectionless integrity . . . . . . Y
Non-repudiation Origin . . . . . . Y
Non-repudiation. Delivery . . . . . . Y
Table I: Illustration of the Relationship of Security Services and Layers [27]
Layer 1 -7 are physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, session
layer, presentation layer and application layer, respectively.
“Y”means service provided; “.” means service not provided.
prompt security services in dynamic wireless environments. These requirements have
drawn considerable attention to physical layer security research. A mobile device in
power saver mode only keeps its physical layer and minimal MAC layer functions
active [5]. If the physical layer can provide more security services, such as peer
entity authentication, the security information exchange can be completed without
activating the upper layers, supporting the application of power saving techniques as
well as the rapidly changing wireless communication environment. In addition, SDR
platforms with their low cost and flexible configuration, such as GNU Radio/USRP,
ease the design and verification processes for new physical layer security methods.
Physical layer security in wireless networks can be implemented by integrat-
ing traditional security mechanisms with the unique properties of the physical layer.
Digital watermarking is one of the most widely adopted security techniques in the
physical layer, since many physical layer attributes, such as channel coding, mod-
2
ulation schemes and transmission power, are favorable candidates for the carrier of
digital watermarking technique [24].
A well-known physical layer watermarking example is the direct sequence
spread spectrum (DSSS) technique, which was originated in military applications.
DSSS technique spreads out the spectrum of an information signal, by taking the
modulo-2 sum of information bits with pseudonoise (PN) sequences. Benefiting from
the pseudorandomness of PN sequences, the DSSS technique is able to offer jamming
resistance, interference rejection, message privacy and a number of other desirable
properties [18]. Specifically with the interference rejection property, DSSS is widely
adopted in commercial wireless network standards, such as IEEE 802.11 [12] and
IEEE 802.15.4 [13], to provide robust communications. However, these standards
make the PN sequences available to public, and hence, expose a weakness that could
be exploited by adversaries. To complement the systematic security for commercial
DSSS systems, researchers proposed to encrypt scrambling sequences [19], employ un-
coordinated PN sequences [25] or extend the set of PN sequences in use [23]. Another
trend is to construct a covert channel on top of a plain DSSS system by manipulating
the PN sequence [21] [35] [15].
1.2 Proposed Work
This thesis proposes a physical layer watermarking technique, which embeds
watermark information into PN sequences of a DSSS system, named watermarked
DSSS or WDSSS technique. WDSSS technique mainly utilizes the correlation pro-
cedure in the DSSS receiver. The correlation procedure in the DSSS receiver applies
the maximum-likelihood decoding method to recover data bits from the spread sig-
nal. This is done by correlating the spread signal with a synchronized copy of the
PN sequence and compares the correlation result to a threshold to decide the value
3
of the data bit. The bit errors in the spread signal are ignored and do not affect the
decoding decision as long as the threshold is satisfied.
The maximum-likelihood decoding algorithm enables WDSSS to go one step
further than DSSS to supply additional physical layer security. The WDSSS trans-
mitter flips chips on chosen positions in the PN sequence to represent authentication
patterns, and then the receiver detects and recovers the authentication patterns by
examining in-sequence positions of flipped chips; meanwhile the controlled number of
flipped chips still allows the receiver to successfully recover the content data. In this
manner, the authentication process can be completed at the physical layer without
requiring extra bandwidth. The WDSSS technique is also useful in another scenario,
where the transmitter and the receiver are not willing to expose their communications,
so the transmitter only broadcasts a seemingly meaningless cover signal embedded
with a secret signal, which can only be detected and recovered by the aware receiver.
This paper also develops a WDSSS prototype system on the GNU Radio/USRP
platform, and implements two embedding methods, the maximized minimum distance
method and the sub-sequence method. Both theoretical analysis and practical experi-
ments are conducted to explore the capability of the WDSSS technique. Results show
that, for the 11-chip PN sequence, increasing artificial chip errors has a quantitatively
predictable impact on the content signal, requiring 2 dB higher signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) to maintain an acceptable packet error rate (PER) for one additional flipped
chip. In terms of the watermark signal, the two embedding methods demonstrated
individual advantages in either PER or throughput. The maximized minimum dis-
tance method outperforms the sub-sequence embedding method with a 3 dB lower
SNR requirement, while the latter provides 400% more throughput than the former
with adequate SNR.
4
1.3 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the back-
ground of the involved techniques and tools. Chapter 3 studies related works in phys-
ical layer security, physical layer watermarking, and physical layer steganography.
Chapter 4 presents the proposed WDSSS technique and explains the implementation
details of the WDSSS prototype system. Chapter 5 analyzes and discusses the per-
formance of the WDSSS prototype system. Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and
discusses the possible future work with the WDSSS technique.
5
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
This chapter will introduce the techniques and tools involved in the develop-
ment of WDSSS, including the watermarking techniques, DSSS and the GNU Ra-
dio/USRP platform, presented in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
2.1 Watermarking
2.1.1 Digital Watermarking
A traditional watermark is a hidden pattern in a sheet of paper, which is made
by changing the fiber density of a certain area on the paper and can only be read when
held against a light [1]. This technique is usually used to determine the authenticity
of the carrier of the watermark, and it was introduced to provide copyright protection
for digital products in 1990’s, known as the digital watermarking technique [14].
In digital watermarking, a watermark signal can be embedded into a content
signal or multiplexed with a content signal [4]. The multiplexing methods consume a
portion of the channel capacity for carrying the dedicated watermark signal, and hence
6
the watermark signal achieves the same quality as the content signal. On the other
hand, embedding the watermark into the content signal fully utilizes channel capacity
by sending the watermark signal and the content signal simultaneously, providing
additional secrecy quality for the watermark signal, at the cost of degradation of
content signal. In this sense, the watermark signal can be viewed as a secondary
communication channel. Most digital watermarking techniques adopt the embedding
method.
The digital watermarking technique has been widely adopted on the upper
network layers. For example, digital watermarking can be applied on multimedia
signals in the application layer, where copyright information is embedded into the least
significant bits of multimedia data, concealing the existence of the hidden information
as well as conserving the quality of the multimedia signal [14].
Digital watermarking is also applied on the transport layer for flow mark-
ing [34]. Flow marking is a method for network enforcement, where a watermark
signal is superimposed on the communication flow at the transmitter side, and a
detecting device is put at the suspicious receiver side to observe whether the water-
mark signal exists in the incoming traffic. The watermarking applications in the flow
marking also requires the invisibility of the watermark signal and the integrity of the
content signal in order to avoid alerting the suspicious receiver.
2.1.2 Steganography
Steganography is a security method that is often compared with watermarking.
Steganography provides a covert channel for a pair of communication parties which
need to conceal the existence of their communications. Redundancy in signals is the
most exploitable feature for steganography, and hence this technique is popularly
used in communication networks to utilize the unoccupied protocol fields or coding
7
redundancy.
Both watermarking and steganography are information hiding techniques, and
both of them can be visible or invisible. The main difference between these two tech-
niques resides in whether the hidden information is related with its carrier. Steganog-
raphy only utilizes the extra capacity of the carrier and conveys secret information
irrelevant to the carrier, while the hidden information in watermarking carries de-
scriptions about the carrier, such as identity, location or permission [3].
2.1.3 Physical Layer Watermarking
As the lowest level of the OSI network model [28], the physical layer provides
the physical connections between communication parties and realizes the virtual data
bits transmission. In wireless networks, the physical layer usually consists of hardware
devices, modulation schemes, transmission medium and coding algorithms. Similar
to the upper OSI layers, there exists a requirement for security services such as con-
fidentiality, authentication and authorization on the physical layer.
Along with the development of SDR technique, which facilitates the imple-
mentation and verification of physical layer functions, the research of physical layer
security has expanded greatly. Various physical layer properties are involved in the
research of physical layer security. The physical layer watermarking specifically makes
use of the randomness and the redundancy in the channel, signal and coding attributes
of the physical layer, modifies one or more of the attributes to represent watermark
signals, in order to provide signal tracing, additional authentication or access control
in the physical layer.
8
2.2 DSSS
2.2.1 DSSS System Model
Figure 1 shows a generic DSSS system model [26]. In a typical DSSS system,
the transmitter first modulates the data signal with a carrier signal, and then spreads
the modulated signal by applying modulo-2 addition to it with a spreading signal.
The spreading signal is generated from a PN sequence running periodically at a
much higher rate than the original data signal. The spreading operation is shown in
Figure 2. Each individual digit in the PN sequence is called a chip to be differentiated
from the bit in data signal, and each period of the PN sequence is used to spread one
data bit. Because the PN sequence is designed to resemble white noise, the spectrum
of the original signal is spread out. Thus, the spectrum of the spread signal occupies
a larger bandwidth and shows a lower power spectral density than that of the original
signal.
Symmetrically, the receiver first performs a correlation process on the incom-
ing signal, that is, it applies the modulo-2 addition to the incoming signal with a
synchronized copy of the spreading signal. The receiver then obtains the underlying
modulated signal, which is in turn demodulated to recover the original data signal.
The duplicating modulo-2 addition provides interference rejection for the DSSS sig-
nal if the interference is narrow band, because modulo-2 addition of the narrow band
interference with the spreading signal will spread out the power of the interference,
and hence will increase receiving SNR of the signal of interest.
2.2.2 DSSS Demodulator
The DSSS demodulator applies the correlation operation in two processing
phases: acquisition in synchronization establishment stage, and decoding in data
9
Figure 1: DSSS System Model
Figure 2: DSSS Spreading Operation. PN sequence in this example is 00010.
10
receiving stage.
In the acquisition phase, correlation can be performed in parallel or sequentially
[31]. A parallel correlation system consists of a series of correlators. Each correlator
corresponds to a phase shifting version of the PN sequence, apart from each other with
1/2 of the chip duration in time. The incoming signal is fed into this set of correlators
simultaneously. A comparator circuit reads correlation results from these correlators
and locates the largest one. The shifting version of PN sequence corresponding to
the largest correlation result is then used to adjust the clock of the PN sequence
generator and the synchronization is established. On the other hand, a sequential
correlation system contains only one correlator, which correlates the incoming signal
with a copy of the PN sequence and compares the correlation result to a threshold. If
the threshold is satisfied, the synchronization is considered successful, otherwise the
PN sequence shifts 1/2 of the chip duration, and the correlator performs the previous
operations again, until the threshold is satisfied.
After the synchronization is established, the DSSS demodulator enters the data
receiving stage and begins to decode the incoming signal. The correlation operation
in this phase correlates the incoming signal with the spreading signal from the PN
sequence generator, and compares the correlation result to a threshold to determine
the value of a data bit.
In both phases, the correlation results are processed with a maximum-likelihood
algorithm, so the incoming signal is handled as groups of chips in one period of PN
sequence instead of each chip being handles individually, providing a possibility to
hide information in the individual chips.
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2.3 GNU Radio/USRP SDR Platform
SDR is a radio communication system consisting of the most essential signal
processing components implemented in software form. Software defined components
in SDR can function on a general purpose processor, and hence significantly reduce the
cost of SDR compared to specialized hardware components. The programmability of
software components also provides reconfigurability, which facilitates the compatibil-
ity of various communication standards and the development of new communication
techniques, as well as reveals the prospect of cognitive communication systems [22].
2.3.1 GNU Radio
GNU Radio [7] is an open-source SDR development toolkit that provides soft-
ware implementations of various digital signal processing components, such as filters,
modulators, demodulators, equalizers and so forth. GNU Radio can be used indepen-
dently as a simulation environment, where communication parties can be connected
directly or via a simulating channel. GNU Radio is more powerful when coupled with
simple external RF front end hardware to construct a radio communication system.
In such scenarios, GNU Radio blocks are the software defined components of the
SDR and can be configured with any sets of parameters to support any signal specific
operations, and the external RF front end is thus only required to provide general
purpose functions such as ADC, DAC, upsampling and downsampling. GNU Radio
is so flexible in realizing new communication systems with low cost requirements that
it is widely adopted in research, academic, and commercial environments.
The GNU Radio API is organized in a layered structure [29], shown in Fig-
ure 3. The core of GNU Radio architecture is the library of C++ classes, including
performance-critical essential signal processing components, multi-threading sched-
uler, buffer and I/O managers, as well as data stream converters. The C++ classes
12
can be accessed directly by software applications written in C++, or via SWIG, the
Simplified Wrapper and Interface Generator. SWIG builds Python extension modules
out of the C++ classes by processing interface definition files that contain declara-
tion information of the C++ classes. The wrapper Python modules are then imported
into Python applications or GNU Radio Companion GUI development environment
to build flow graphs. A flow graph is the data structure defined in GNU Radio to
represent a signal processing path.
A typical flow graph is shown in Figure 4. The blocks represent signal pro-
cessing components and the edges represent the data stream passing along the signal
processing path. The data stream is internally stored as a series of integers, float
numbers or complex numbers in a shared circular buffer. The flow graph is actually
driven by the data stream. Each block is the data producer to its downstream neigh-
bor. At the flow graph construction stage, the GNU Radio scheduler allocates each
block a thread, along with a read pointer and a write pointer to access the shared
buffer. When the flow graph starts running, each block checks whether it has available
output space and enough input items, and if the requirements are satisfied, that block
starts its operation and continues until running out of its output allocation. When
the source block stops producing output, it sends out a stopping signal and this signal
is passed down the flow graph, and consequently all blocks stop after using up their
input items, and at this point the flow graph is considered successfully executed.
2.3.2 USRP
A popular set of RF hardware that can be used with GNU Radio is the Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), designed by Ettus Research [6]. Some USRP
models are used as RF front end devices connected to a host computer via a USB or
Gigabit Ethernet interface, while other models are built with an embedded processor
13
Figure 3: GNU Radio Layered API
Figure 4: GNU Radio Flow Graph and Shared Circular Buffer
14
Specifications USRP2 USRP1
FPGA Xilinx Spartan 3-2000 Altera Cyclone EP1C12
ADC 14-bit, 100 MHz 12-bit, 64 MHz
DAC 16-bit, 400 MHz 14-bit, 128 MHz
RF Bandwidth to/from host 25MHz @ 16bits 8MHz @ 16bits
Interface Gigabit Ethernet USB 2.0
Table II: Specification Comparison of USRP2 and USRP1 [8]
and memory and thus can be used as standalone devices. When the USRP is used
as a RF front end, its complete setup includes a motherboard, with one or more
daughterboards and antenna sets attached, as well as a USB or Gigabit Ethernet
cable linking it to the host computer. The motherboard of the USRP is equipped
with high speed signal processing hardware blocks, including FPGA, ADC and DAC,
and can support sampling rates up to 100M samples per second. The daughterboards
are the frequency specific front-ends in the range of 0 Hz to 6 GHz. USRP2 was the
first evolution from the original USRP1. The comparison between USRP2 and the
USRP1 on the important specifications are listed in Table II [8]. This thesis used
USRP2 to implement the prototype WDSSS system given its higher sampling rate
and wider bandwidth. Figure 5 shows a picture of one of the USRP2 units used for
the prototype implements.
There are several important parameters required to configure the USRP2 so
that it can function correctly. First, a USRP2 need to know the target center fre-
quency to tune its antenna. Then, an interpolation rate is necessary for a USRP2 in
transmission mode. The DAC in USRP2 handles samples at a constant rate, 100M
samples per second, which is usually more than adequate for samples generated from
user programs in the host computer. The USRP2 therefore applies an interpolator to
convert the samples from the host computer to accommodate the clock rate of DAC.
Similarly, a USRP2 in receiving mode requires a decimation rate in order to reduce
the sample rate before transferring the received signal to the host computer.
15
Figure 5: USRP2
2.3.3 Related SDR Projects with GNU Radio/USRP
DSSS has been implemented in several SDR projects on the GNU Radio/USRP
platform, such as the SPAN 802.11b receiver, the BBN 802.11b project and the UCLA
ZigBee PHY implementation. The WDSSS prototype system is different from the
above projects, in that it treats every single chip individually, and hence makes use
the coding redundancy of the PN sequence. The following is the introduction to the
related DSSS projects.
The SPAN 802.11b receiver project implements the matched filter for the corre-
lation processing in the FPGA of USRP [20]. The USB interface between USRP and
the host computer is not capable of providing sufficient bandwidth for the 802.11b
signal, since the DSSS-based 802.11b signal requires 22 MHz bandwidth while the
maximum bandwidth for the USB interface is only 8 MHz. The authors thus placed
the correlation operation in the FPGA of the USRP, so that the sample rate can be
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reduced to a sustainable value for the USB interface. Their implementation reduced
the sample rate and computational complexity for the host computer and meanwhile
provided a full bandwidth 802.11b receiver.
The BBN 802.11b project includes a transmitter and a receiver [32]. A previous
version of this project was an 802.11b receiver implemented on USRP. To overcome
the same bandwidth problem that the authors of the SPAN 802.11b receiver faced,
this project applies a bandwidth reduction method, decimating the incoming sample
rate to 8M Hz prior to feeding them into the USB interface in the USRP. The resulting
signal is distorted due to the bandwidth loss and only the 1M bps signal can survive.
The updated version is implemented with USRP2, which eliminates the bandwidth
limitation for the 802.11b signals. The spreading and correlation operations are im-
plemented as the matching filter combining with a rate converter in the transmitter
and the receiver, respectively. The 11-chip Barker Sequence is used as the taps of the
matching filters in both sides. The USRP2 version of BBN 802.11b project provided
a complete 802.11b system built on the GNU Radio/USRP platform, and is widely
adopted in 802.11b signal research.
The UCLA ZigBee PHY project implemented a transmitter and a receiver in
the 2.4G Hz band of the IEEE 802.15.4 [2]. Their work deals with the set of 16 32-chip
PN sequences and the underlying OQPSK modulation scheme. The DSSS spreading
operation maps a 4-bit symbol into one of the 16 PN sequences, and sends the PN
sequence instead of the symbol. Conversely, the correlation process in the receiver
compares the incoming chips to all of the 16 PN sequences, and the PN sequence with
the minimum Hamming distance to the chip set is chosen. Meanwhile the distance
is compared to a threshold, and if the threshold is satisfied, the index of the PN
sequence is rendered as the symbol value.
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CHAPTER III
RELATED WORKS
This chapter reviews existing works in physical layer security methods utiliz-
ing DSSS, physical layer watermarking techniques, and physical layer steganography
schemes.
3.1 DSSS in Physical Layer Security
A lot of research endeavors have looked at physical layer security in commercial
DSSS systems, managing to provide additional security service. The authors of [19]
proposed to encrypt the scrambling sequence of CDMA systems with the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), in order to hinder the potential detection and recovery
of PN sequences via intercepting sufficient transmission signals. Several individual
works considered expanding the PN sequence set used in a DSSS system, such as
uncoordinated PN sequences [25] and time hopping PN sequence management [10]
and [23].
The authors of [25] aimed to unleash the PN sequences from being a shared
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secret. In their system, the PN sequences are placed in a public set, from which
the transmitter randomly chooses one to spread its data signal, and consequently,
the receiver needs to search the whole set to locate the one for its received signal.
The major drawback for their method is the low efficiency in the receiver program.
Thus, they suggested to employ multiple transmitters to individually send the same
data signal with different PN sequences through a band of channels. In this way, the
receiver gains some time efficiency by trading the channel efficiency.
Both [10] and [23] applied a hopping scheme to manage an expanded set of PN
sequences. Compared to the totally uncoordinated PN sequences technique [25], these
two techniques allow the transmitter and the receiver to share a PN sequence hop-
ping scheme, which provides certain level of synchronization, and hence facilitate the
receiver in the decoding process. The authors of [23] took one step further from [10]
to implement the suggested PN sequences hopping scheme on the GNU Radio/USRP
platform. In their prototype system, the synchronization protocol generates the same
set of PN sequences at both sides and designates the hopping sequence. The trans-
mitter has a Code-Life-Time to determine active PN sequence for spreading, and
the receiver first decodes the incoming signal with the current active PN sequence
and will move on to the next sequence if current one does not produce the satisfied
result. The authors also assigned different preamble sequences corresponding to dif-
ferent sets of PN sequences to further blur the well known samples. Their design
specifically addressed issues in performance loss, security gain and synchronization.
Their experimental results demonstrated 1 dB and 2 dB in performance loss in the
scenarios of a 60dB attenuating cable connection and wireless channel, respectively.
In addition, the authors designed an interception attack algorithm to evaluate the
security property of the system.
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3.2 Works in Physical Layer Watermarking
The works in this section combined the watermarking technique with diverse
physical layer properties to provide authentication service in the physical layer.
The authors of [9] designed a physical layer watermarking approach for li-
censed user authentication in the Digital TV (DTV) spectrum. The coexistence of
licensed DTV stations and broadband users necessitates the research for methods to
maintain the spectrum access priority of licensed users. The authors managed to in-
tegrate a fingerprinting technique with typical receiver preprocessing algorithms such
as equalization. Their watermark signal is composed of the finite length synthetic
FIR channel response, which equivalently introduces a slight linear inter-symbol in-
terference to the content signal. Consequently, the receiver equalizer applies two
individual tap weight vectors corresponding to the synthetic FIR channel responses
and the real FIR channel components separately, and recovers the watermark signal
by removing the estimate of the real FIR channel components. They also presented
a cryptographic watermark design method by generating a digital signature with a
hash function in terms of time, location and frequency of the transmitter. The au-
thors introduced two properties to evaluate their authentication signal, namely the
ratio of the authentication symbol rate to the primary signal rate (ASR) and the ratio
of the authentication signal power to the primary signal power (ASP). Their Monte
Carlo simulation results showed that embedding a watermark signal has little effect
on the bit error rate (BER) of the content signal. The BER of the watermark signal
is improved by decreasing the ASR, while the channel estimation mean square error is
only slightly increased. In terms of power ratio, the ASP is required to exceed 0.002
for a watermark signal to outperform the content signal, while the ASP is determined
by the properties of the equalizer.
Paper [33] proposed a framework to superimpose a watermark signal into a
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content signal in a way that would not consume extra bandwidth. The watermark
signal in their system is generated by the following steps. The first step is applying a
function to the content signal and the secret key to generate a sequence. The sequence
from the first step is then padded to match the length of the content signal. Finally
the watermark signal is combined with the content signal using a small portion of the
total transmission power. The generating function used in the first step is responsible
for the security property of the watermark signal, so it should be chosen to establish
an uncorrelated relationship between the content signal and the watermark signal,
but still needs to relate the watermark signal with the length of the content signal.
The aware receiver can apply the same generating function used by the transmitter
to the recovered content signal and the known secret key to recover the watermark
signal. The authors suggested to use robust hash functions as the generating function
to overcome the decoding errors in the recovered content signal.
Two physical layer watermarking techniques were proposed in [16], applying
on the payload or the cyclic time of an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) signal, respectively. The first method, named constellation dither (CD),
spreads QPSK modulated watermark bits with a Gaussian distributed PN sequence
and then superimposes them onto the OFDM payload data at a relatively low power
level. It is equivalently to add an additive white Gaussian noise with a low power
level to the OFDM payload symbols. The receiver then detects the watermark signal
by applying a match filter and a QPSK modulator to the received signal, with the
knowledge of the power allocation of the watermark signal and the content signal.
Thus, the detection performance of CD technique depends on the spreading processing
gain and the power allocation parameter.
The second method, baud dither (BD), uses a positive or a negative cyclic time
shift to represent a watermark bit of 1 or 0, which is encoded with the Manchester
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coding scheme, and hence it can be viewed as intentionally introducing time jitter
to the OFDM symbols after attaching the cyclic prefix. The receiver deduces the
watermark signal by looking at the shifted version of OFDM symbol. If the last
sample appears at the beginning of the symbol, the shift is considered positive. On the
other hand, if the first sample appears at the end of the symbol, the shift is considered
negative. The positive or negative sign is then interpreted into a watermark bit. The
orthogonality of OFDM is still preserved because the largest multi-path delay is less
than the difference between the guard interval length and the introduced time shift.
The detection performance of BD technique depends on the received SNR and the
number of pilots used in the receiver tracking circuit.
The authors implemented a testbed for the CD watermark technique, and
provided analytical and simulation results for both CD and BD watermark techniques.
Analytical BER is calculated using the literature BER equation for BPSK and QPSK.
According to the results, if the power portion for the CD watermark signal is less than
or equal to 0.01, there is only slight degradation of the content signal’s BER. The BD
watermark signal’s BER is much better than the OFDM content signal’s BER, while
the BD watermark signal has negligible influence to the OFDM content signal’s BER.
Both methods can achieve 10s kbits/sec capability for the watermark signal and hence
can provide enhanced authentication services for dynamic network environments such
as roaming ad hoc networks.
The author of [17] proposed a physical layer watermarking method utilizing
the M -ary phase-shift keying (M-PSK) modulation schemes. This work adopted the
adversary model, configurable features and measurement merits of stealth, robustness
and security from [33], and can be viewed as a type of constellation dithering similar
to [16], but was implemented on the M-PSK constellation instead. The principle
behind the design is that the M-PSK modulator encodes log2M bits of data into one
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symbol, which is a point on a constellation map. Different values of M result in a
different number of bits per symbol and different phase distances between points on
the constellation map. An M-PSK demodulator then matches each received symbol
to the points on the constellation map, and locates the point that has a minimum
distance with the received symbol, considering the effect from channel fading, additive
noise and other interference. The physical layer watermarking method presented in
this paper uses a fraction of the phase distance of the content signal to embed the
watermark signal. Content bits and watermark bits are encoded together for a single
transmitted symbol. The combined signal is then transmitted using a PSK scheme
with higher M value. The watermark signal appears as noise to unaware users who
only know and apply the content signal PSK to analyze received signal. Meanwhile
the watermark signal can be detected and recovered by aware users who decode the
incoming signal with the higher M-PSK scheme and analyze the relative shift of the
recovered signal to the content signal. There is a trade-off between the SNRs of the
content signal and the watermark signal when choosing the shifted phase distance for
the watermark signal. The author suggested that this method can be extended to
QAM systems by altering the QAM order.
The author developed the method on the GNU Radio/USRP platform, along
with the use of Matlab. GNU Radio and USRP were responsible for the communica-
tion processing, and Matlab was used to encode the content signal with the watermark
signal as well as to analyze the received data. The modulation pair of DBPSK and
D8PSK was used in his implementation, as shown in Figure 6. The transmitter en-
codes symbols of 3 bits with D8PSK, and then unaware users decodes 1 bit with
DBPSK, while aware users decode 3 bits with D8PSK.
The author evaluated his work by first deriving the BER performance from the
theoretical BER of PSK generated from the BERTool GUI in Matlab. The analysis
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Figure 6: Watermarking on M-PSK [17]: the bits outside the large circle are content
data bits; the bits inside the large circle are watermark data bits; the bit patterns in
the small circles are the constellation points for D8PSK, which is used to encode the
embedded signal.
concluded that if only PSK is considered, the separation phase between two symbols
can be used directly to deduce the effective power when calculating bit energy to noise
density ratio. Because the proposed system was implemented with DPSK, where the
demodulator decodes data by using the previous symbol as a phase reference for the
current symbol, the rotation caused by noise or interference would introduce extra
bit error. The estimated watermark BER is roughly 1.5 times of the BER of an
ordinary D8PSK signal. The author then created two Monte Carlo simulations to
further estimate the BER of the proposed watermarking method. Finally, the BER
of the content signal and the watermark signal were measured in a real-world wireless
environment with various distances between the transmitter and the receiver, for
the unaware and the aware receptions. BER values between different pairs of PSK
modulation schemes were also compared. The observed BER values in all scenarios
were compared with the estimated BER curves and showed overall better results,
despite the existence of a BER floor caused by Wi-Fi signals. When in the identical
environment, the content signal with watermark had worse performance than when
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the content signal was transmitted without watermark.
The authors of [30] presented another watermarking algorithm, in which water-
marking bits are bit-wise multiplied with spreading codes and the results are summed,
the sum is then multiplied by an intensity parameter alpha, and then added selected
modulated data bits. The watermark bits are extracted from the transmission by cross
correlating selected bits with the spreading codes, producing a result with positive or
negative sign indicating the value of watermark bits.
3.3 Works in Physical Layer Steganography
Steganography is another technique that can be used to provide physical layer
security services. Paper [15] explored all permutations of 232 PN sequences used in
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and found that since the minimum distance is 12 and
maximum distance is 20, there are 145, 742, 202 chip sequences can be mapped to
each symbol. The author thus exploited this encoding redundancy, and assigned a
certain amount of chips in a PN sequence to represent the data of the steganographic
channel. The embedding process for the PN sequence is achieved by applying the
following formula: newchipseq = chipseq ⊕ stegmask; where newchipseq is the chip
sequence used to spread the data symbol, chipseq is the original 32-chip sequence
for the data symbol in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, and stegmask is the codeword
representing the embedded steganographic data.
The security for the system was mainly realized by generating the stegmask
using a counter-mode block cipher with a counter value of the Absolute Slot Number
(ASN), which can count the number of time-division slots since network creation,
concatenated with a 0-based counter, so that the stegmask appears to be a random
error to a third party. The performance of the steganographic channel with vari-
ous capacities was evaluated by simulation. According to the simulation results, a
25
steganographic channel with the same data rate as the content signal can maintain
the content signal performance while providing a relatively high data rate for the
secret signal.
A similar technique is proposed in [21]. This paper mainly presented the
encoding scheme of steganographic data bits and sought a method to minimize the
effect of the steganographic signal on the underlying 802.15.4 data signal. The authors
focused on an AWGN channel and considered the effect of signal coding with a given
modulation scheme. According to the observations of the authors, when data bits
are encoded with a larger code words, the energy per bit to noise ratio required for
a certain SNR value is smaller, and this implies a higher noise tolerance ability. The
larger the Hamming distance between the symbol code words, the higher the noise
tolerance. Specifically in IEEE 802.15.4, where the PN sequences are the symbol
code words, the minimal Hamming distance between the PN sequences is 12, which
provides a minimum of 6 chip error tolerance to ensure symbol recovery. The authors
then deduced the minimum acceptable SNR as -2.2 dB, considering the allowable
maximum symbol error rate of 1.9× 10−4 and a coherent QPSK detector.
The authors aimed to convey secret information through an 802.15.4 system,
to achieve maximum steganographic channel capacity, and meanwhile to maintain
the performance of the original 802.15.4 signal. Thus, they proposed an encoding
scheme, which expands each original 802.15.4 PN sequence into a set of PN sequences
in such a way that each derived set of PN sequences are closer to the corresponding
original PN sequence than to any other PN sequences in the original 802.15.4 set.
This encoding scheme allows an unaware receiver to recover the 802.15.14 signal
with normal correlation procedure. In addition, the authors designed two ways for
the aware receiver to decode the embedded steganographic data. One way is to
recover the underlying 802.15.4 signal first and then to decode the steganographic
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C0.0 =C0 = d9c3522e C0.16 = 5bd350aa
C0.1 = 19e3da2a C0.17 = 5ce3d02e
C0.2 = 31f3522e C0.18 = 91d2da2e
C0.3 = 45c35a2f C0.19 = c1b3d22e
C0.4 = 4983da6e C0.20 = c3c3d06e
C0.5 = 49d74a2e C0.21 = d0d3d42e
C0.6 = 515b526e C0.22 = d1c38b2e
C0.7 = 51935a3e C0.23 = d1d3d2a2
C0.8 = 51d3512f C0.24 = d1eb1a2a
C0.9 = 51e7c22e C0.25 = d1f35246
C0.10 = 53e3126e C0.26 = d5c3926a
C0.11 = 55c3546e C0.27 = d913d82e
C0.12 = 58f35a26 C0.28 = d9c7c82a
C0.13 = 59c3196e C0.29 = d9d39a24
C0.14 = 59d35c2c C0.30 = d9f2580e
C0.15 = 59e34a4e C0.31 = ddd3d00c
Table III: One expanded set of PN sequences for steganography in 802.15.14 [21]:
C0 is the original PN sequence for symbol value 0; C0.1 - C0.31 are the derived PN
sequences from the original PN sequence; the minimum distance in this PN sequence
set is 6.
data by searching the corresponding set of PN sequences. The other way is to use the
expanded set of PN sequences to recover the 802.15.4 signal and the steganographic
data at the same time. Receivers using these two different decoding methods are
referred to as a hierarchical receiver and a full receiver, respectively. There is a trade-
off between the decoding ability of 802.15.4 data and steganographic data due to
the distance among the set of PN sequences for one particular original PN sequence.
Table III shows one example of the expanded PN sequences set.
Their simulation results for the proposed method showed that the minimum
acceptable SNR was increased to 1.95dB for the underlying 802.15.4 content signal.
For the steganographic data decoding, when considering same amount of sent symbols,
the full receiver only requires a 1.5 dB minimum SNR, while the hierarchical receiver
shows a SNR closer to the underlying 802.15.4 content signal. The full receiver can
achieve an effectively lower symbol error rate because fewer symbols are required
for a complete packet, and this led to a 1.2 dB minimum SNR. In summary, the
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SNR increased 3.4 dB compared to the original 802.15.4 signal while the data rate is
increased 3.5 dB, so this yields a 0.1 dB decrease in energy per bit to noise ratio.
The authors of [35] proposed a steganography scheme based on [15] as well
as adopting the Hamming distance maximization method in [21]. They provided
additional discussion in terms of error correcting capability in the code words de-
sign. They suggested to utilize chip positions to carry steganogaphy information.
The steganogaphy information is then recovered by obtaining altered chip positions
information after comparing the received signal to the standard sequences. Thus the
size of the covert communication alphabet is equal to the sum of the combinations
of each possible number of altered chips. However, they deduced that the optimal
number of altered chips is five for the purposes of interference resistance. According
to the simulation results of this paper, the BER and receiver sensitivity are bound by
the number of altered chips, and an optimal embedding scheme is 4 steganographic
bits for each PN sequence.
3.4 Summary
The WDSSS system in this thesis employs a similar technique to modify PN
sequences as in [15], [21] and [35]. However, instead of only providing simulation
results, this thesis implements a prototype system and obtains experimental perfor-
mance results for the proposed WDSSS technique. Another similarity can be found
in [23], since the modified PN sequences in WDSSS system can be viewed as an
expanded code set. The major difference between [23] and this thesis is that the
work in [23] only needs to decode the underlying system and ignores any chip errors,
while this thesis utilizes the extra PN sequences to carry additional information when
maintaining the underlying system function.
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CHAPTER IV
WATERMARKED DSSS
4.1 WDSSS Technique Overview
The goal for designing the WDSSS technique is to embed authentication infor-
mation in the PN sequences of the DSSS technique in an imperceptible manner, so as
to complement the physical layer security for a DSSS system with publicly known PN
sequences. Two fundamental premises for the proposed watermarked DSSS technique
are the coding redundancy of PN sequences and the correlation procedure of the DSSS
receiver. In order to provide robust communications, PN sequences are designed with
high error correcting capability, which implies coding redundancy in good communi-
cation environments. The coding redundancy can consequently be exploited to carry
additional information without requiring extra bandwidth. The correlation procedure
of the DSSS receiver also reassures the viability of embedding secret information in
the PN sequences, since only the correlation results of the incoming signal with the
entire PN sequence will be used to recover the data bits and the artificial chip errors
are overlooked. In this context, PN sequences are no longer secret keys and become
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the hosts for authentication information.
The WDSSS technique consists of two major operations, watermark embedding
and extraction, which reside in a transmitter and an aware receiver, respectively.
Figure 7 shows a communication system model realized with the WDSSS technique.
A watermark embedding processing block and an extraction processing block are
added in the classic DSSS signal processing paths.
In the transmitter, the watermark embedding processing block flips chips in
the PN sequence at positions indicated by the watermark information, and then the
PN sequence with flipped chips is used to spread the content bit. In the aware re-
ceiver, the demodulator correlates incoming signals with the original PN sequence and
determines content bit values by comparing the correlation results with a threshold.
The unmatched chip positions are then passed to the watermark extraction process-
ing block, which in turn translates the position information into watermark bits. On
the other hand, in an unaware receiver without the watermark extraction processing
block, the demodulator still can recover the content bit values based on the corre-
lation results, but ignores the specific positions of the error chips since it does not
examine the individual chips.
4.2 Watermark Embedding Methods
The WDSSS technique embeds watermark information by flipping chips on
designated positions and extracts watermark information by identifying flipped chip
positions. Thus, the key point for the WDSSS technique is to establish a mapping
relationship between the watermark data bits and the chip positions in the PN se-
quence.
One simple method is to exhaustively use all combinations of chip positions
to represent watermark data bits. For a PN sequence of length n, if m chips can be
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Figure 7: WDSSS System Model
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flipped, the number of position combinations is
(
n
m
)
. Thus, the number of watermark
bits that can be represented by one modified PN sequence is blog2
(
n
m
)c. Because one
PN sequence is equivalent to one content data bit, this embedding method can provide
a much higher watermark data rate than the content data rate. However, this simple
method has several weaknesses. First, it can not provide security for watermark
information since the combinations of chip positions are straightforward. Second, the
extraction process is time consuming because the number of combinations increases
exponentially when the number of flipped chips increases. Third, this method is
vulnerable to noise because it does not provide error correcting capability. In order to
provide more advantages in terms of security of watermark data, processing efficiency,
robustness, and embedding capability, two other embedding methods were designed
and implemented, namely the maximized minimum distance method and the sub-
sequence method.
The maximized minimum distance method views the set of modified PN se-
quences with flipped chips as a set of code words. According to coding theory [26], the
error correcting capability t of one set of code words is determined by the minimum
Hamming distance dmin of the set:
t = b(dmin − 1)/2c (4.1)
As shown in Figure 8, the centers of the circles are chosen to be the code words with
maximized minimum distance in this code space, the radius of each circle is half of
the minimum distance. All code words within the circle can be decoded as the center
code word, that is, any errors that cause the center code word to transform into
any code word within the circle can be corrected. Therefore, maximized minimum
distance can provide optimal error correcting capability. Specifically in the WDSSS
system, the generating method for such a set of PN sequences is to flip chips at
non-overlapped positions. Table IV shows the sets of modified PN sequences for the
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Figure 8: Minimum Distance Illustration [26]
Watermark Modified Flipped Total Embedding
Bit Value PN Sequence Positions Capability (bits)
0 01001100101 9, 7, 3
1
1 00010101000 6, 2, 0
Table IV: Maximized minimum distance method: A Set of Modified PN Sequences
for the 11-chip Barker Sequence (00011101101) with 3 Flipped Chips
11-chip Barker Sequence (00011101101) with 3 flipped chips. The resulting set has a
minimum distance of 6.
As a result, both the embedding and extraction processes for this method
are performed by a simple mapping table lookup. This method provides security
for watermark information because the set of PN sequences is the shared secret for
the transmitter and the aware receiver. This method also provides optimal error
correcting capability with the maximized minimum distance. The drawback of this
method is its low embedding capability, because there is a limited number of PN
sequences that can satisfy the maximized minimum distance requirement.
The other method designed for this paper is the sub-sequence method. The
basis of the sub-sequence method is to divide the PN sequence into sub-sequences,
flip one chip in each sub-sequence and then combine the flipped chips together to rep-
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Flipped Sub-sequence Starting Embedding Total Embedding
Chips ID Position Capability (bits) Capability (bits)
1 0 0 3 3
2
0 0 2
4
1 4 2
3
0 0 1
51 2 2
2 6 2
4
0 0 1
5
1 2 1
2 4 1
3 6 2
Table V: Sub-sequence Watermark Embedding Method for 11-chip PN Sequence
resent a watermark value. Table V shows an example of the sub-sequence embedding
method which flips up to 4 chips in the 11-chips Barker Sequence. The embedding
process for the sub-sequence method first divides the watermark bytes into bit groups
corresponding to sub-sequences. Then for each bit group, the position of the chip to
flip is calculated as the sum of the start position of each sub-sequence and the bit
value. Finally the chips at the determined positions are flipped. The modified PN
sequence is then sent to the DSSS modulator for spreading. On the receiver side,
the watermark extraction block first records the flipped positions from the DSSS de-
modulator, and then for each flipped position, calculates the bit value by subtracting
the start position of the corresponding sub-sequence from the flipped position, and
concatenates all bit values to recover the watermark byte.
This method can also provide security for the watermark information because
the sub-sequence dividing scheme is the shared secret between the transmitter and
the aware receiver. The embedding and extraction processes are efficient because the
processing time is linear with the number of flipped chips. As shown in Table V, this
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method provides high embedding capability. However, this method does not provide
error correcting capabilities for the watermark signal because the minimum distance
is 2 in the sets of modified PN sequences.
The sub-sequence method and the maximized minimum distance method are
implemented in the prototype WDSSS system of this thesis. Their performance results
are analyzed and compared in the next chapter. In terms of the security property of
the watermark signal, these embedding methods can provide different security levels
to meet the requirements of different applications. The maximized distance method
is suitable for critical watermark information, which is worth the price of a lower
watermark bit rate. On the other hand, the sub-sequence method can be applied to
less important watermark information with more tolerance to decoding errors.
4.3 Prototype System Implementation
The WDSSS prototype system was developed using an incremental software
building methodology. First, the digital communication example in the GNU Radio
package was adopted to construct the underlying DBPSK system. Then a generic
DSSS system was built on top of the DBPSK system. Finally, the WDSSS system
was implemented by expanding the DSSS transmitter program and the DSSS receiver
program to include watermark embedding and extraction processing blocks. The rest
of this section will explain the implementation details.
4.3.1 Baseline DBPSK System
The baseline DBPSK communication system provides the fundamental com-
munication functions. Important processing blocks along the transmission path of
the DBPSK system are shown in Figure 9. Their functions are described as follows:
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Preamble Access code Packet length Packet number Payload CRC32
2 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes 2 bytes variable 4 bytes
Table VI: Packet Format
• Data source - This block generates data packets. The packet format is shown
in Table VI. This processing block reads in arbitrary number of bytes from a
random binary file. A packet number is then assigned for that batch of bytes.
Next the CRC field is then calculated. The payload and CRC fields are then
masked with the output of a 15-LFSR, and prefixed them with the preamble,
access code and packet length.
• Byte unpacker - This block treats the packets from the data source as a byte
stream and decomposes each byte into a stream of bits.
• Symbol mapper - This block maintains a symbol mapping table and converts
data bits into symbol bits using gray code. The conversions for this DBPSK
system are 1 to 1 and 0 to 0, since each symbol only contains one bit.
• Differential encoder - This block calculates output bit y[n] based on input bit
x[n] and one previous output bit y[n− 1] with the equation:
y[n] = x[n]⊕ y[n− 1] (4.2)
• Constellation encoder: This block converts symbol bits into complex constella-
tion symbols. The conversions for this DBPSK system are 1 to −1 + 0j and 0
to 1 + 0j.
• Matched filter - This block implements a root raised cosine matched filter with
roll-off factor 0.35, and also produces complex samples out of constellation sym-
bols.
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Figure 9: DBPSK System Transmitter Flow Graph
• USRP2 - This block represents signal processing occurring in the USRP2 plat-
form. USRP2 draws samples from the host computer, upsamples them to ac-
commodate the clock frequency of the DAC, and finally transmits the resulting
analog signal via antenna.
As shown in Figure 10, processing blocks along the receiving path of the
DBPSK system provide symmetric functions to blocks in the transmitter. Their
detailed functions are described as follows:
• USRP2 - This block represents signal processing occurring in the USRP2 re-
ceiving path. USRP2 tunes the antenna to the same center frequency as that
in the transmitting USRP2, receives analog signals via antenna, converts them
into digital samples, decimates samples to the sample rate required by the host
computer, and sends the samples to the host computer via the Ethernet inter-
face.
• Channel filter - This block implements a low pass filter to obtain samples from
the desired channel.
• Matched filter - This block is a root raised cosine filter with roll-off factor 0.35
37
to match the transmitter root raised filter so as to align samples .
• MPSK receiver - This block processes samples in one symbol interval to estimate
the symbol value. This block also tracks the carrier phase and frequency errors
with a Costas loop, and corrects symbol timing errors with a modified Mueller
and Muller algorithm.
• Differential decoder - This block calculates output complex symbol y[n] based
on the phase difference between the current input symbol x[n] and one previous
input symbol x[n− 1] using the equation:
y[n] = x[n]× x∗[n− 1] (4.3)
• Constellation decoder - This block determines the correct symbol value by se-
lecting the constellation point that has the minimum Euclidean distance with
the estimated symbol value, and also converts complex symbol values into sym-
bol bits.
• Symbol mapper - This block reverses gray encoding and converts symbol bits
into data bits.
• Byte packer - This block groups data bits into bytes.
• Frame sink - This block correlates the byte stream with known preamble and
access code to reconstruct packets, and inspects these packets with CRC32 to
determine whether the packets are correct.
4.3.2 Generic DSSS System
In order to implement a DSSS system on top of the baseline DBPSK system,
a DSSS modulator and a DSSS demodulator are added to the transmitter and the
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Figure 10: DBPSK System Receiver Flow Graph
receiver respectively. A rate converter is also included in both paths to deal with the
conversion of the sampling rate and the USRP2 parameters caused by the switching
of bit rate and chip rate. The explanation of the important denotations involved are
shown in Table VII.
The flow graph of the DSSS transmitter is shown in Figure 11. Functional
blocks relevant to DSSS are explained below:
• DSSS modulator - This block applies modulo-2 addition to each differential
encoded data bit with every chip of the PN sequence. The ith altered bit ai is
produced with the equation:
ai = bj ⊕ ck, j = bi/nc and k = i mod n, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (4.4)
where, n is the length of the PN sequence, bj is the jth original bit and ck is
the kth chip in the PN sequence. {ai} substitutes for {bj} in the subsequent
processing blocks, and hence the bit rate needs to be adjusted accordingly.
• Rate converter - This block performs a series of rate conversions to obtain the
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Denotations In DSSS Transmitter In DSSS Receiver
ai ith altered bit ith received bit
{ai} Altered bit stream Received bit stream
Ra Altered bit rate Received bit rate
bj jth original bit jth recovered bit
{bj} Original bit stream Recovered bit stream
Rb Original bit rate Recovered bit rate
ck kth chip kth chip
n Length of PN sequence Length of PN sequence
spb Samples per symbol Samples per symbol
Rs Sample rate generated by DSSS Sample rate accepted by DSSS
Rt Targeted sample rate Expected sample rate
interp Interpolation rate for USRP2 n/a
FDAC Sample rate of USRP2 DAC n/a
decim n/a Decimation rate for USRP2
FADC n/a Sample rate of USRP2 ADC
Table VII: Explanations of Important Denotations
interpolation rate for USRP2 configuration, and then applies rational resam-
pling if necessary. First, the original bit rate Rb is converted to the altered bit
rate Ra for {ai} with the equation:
Ra = Rb × n (4.5)
The number of samples for one symbol spb can be customized with a command
line option, and since the symbol rate is the same as bit rate for the DBPSK
modulation, the sample rate Rs will be:
Rs = Ra × spb (4.6)
If Rs is an integer factor of FDAC , it is directly used to calculate the interpolation
rate interp for the USRP2:
interp = FDAC/Rs (4.7)
If the result of FDAC/Rs is a fraction, interp needs to be chosen as the largest
integer factor of FDAC that is smaller than FDAC/Rs, and the resulting sample
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Figure 11: DSSS System Transmitter Flow Graph: blocks in bold boxes represent
additional DSSS processing blocks added to the baseline DBPSK system
rate is assigned to be the targeted sample rate Rt:
Rt = FDAC/interp (4.8)
A rational resampler function is then called to convert Rs to Rt before samples
are sent to the USRP2.
The corresponding DSSS processing blocks in the receiver include:
• Rate converter - This block performs similar rate conversions as the counterpart
block in the transmitter. First, the expected recovered bit rate Rb is converted
to the received bit rate Ra for {ai} with the equation:
Ra = Rb × n (4.9)
The number of samples for one symbol spb is also customized with a command
line option, so the sample rate Rs will be:
Rs = Ra × spb (4.10)
If Rs is an integer factor of FADC , it is directly used to calculate the decimation
rate decim for the USRP2:
decim = FADC/Rs (4.11)
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If the result of FADC/Rs is a fraction, decim needs to be chosen as the largest
integer factor of FADC that is smaller than FADC/Rs, and the resulting sample
rate is assigned to be the expected sample rate Rt:
Rt = FADC/decim (4.12)
A rational resampler is responsible for converting Rt to Rs as soon as it receives
samples from the USRP2.
• Constellation decoder - This block replaces the differential decoder that is used
in the DSSS receiving path. It is used to convert incoming complex values into
binary bits whose corresponding complex values have the minimum Euclidean
distances to the incoming complex values.
• DSSS demodulator - This block implements a sliding correlator [26], combining
the two correlation processes in the synchronization and data decoding stages.
The sliding correlator first correlates the received bit stream {ai} from the
constellation decoder with chips of the PN sequence to produce a correlation
result sum:
sum =
n∑
k=1
ai ⊕ ck, i = n× j + k, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . (4.13)
Then two thresholds, threshold0 and threshold1, are used to determine the
value of bj. If sum is less than or equal to threshold0, then bj is determined to
be 0. If sum is larger than or equal to threshold1, then bj is determined to be
1. The sliding correlator then advances one PN sequence period. If sum falls
between the two thresholds, it is considered to be a synchronization error, and
the sliding correlator advances only one chip.
• Differential decoder - This block performs differential decoding on the bit stream
from the DSSS demodulator, which actually contains the differential decoded
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Figure 12: DSSS System Receiver Flow Graph: blocks in bold boxes represent addi-
tional DSSS processing blocks to the baseline DBPSK system
bits. The operation is to calculate the output bit y[n] based on the difference
between the current input bit x[n] and the previous input bit x[n− 1] using the
equation:
y[n] = x[n]⊕ x[n− 1] (4.14)
4.3.3 WDSSS System
Implementation of the WDSSS technique requires several additional important
components, including the watermark embedding processor, the extraction processor,
and a number of auxiliary blocks, which handle the watermark data preparation and
interpretation. Processing blocks for WDSSS transmitter are shown in Figure 13.
Their functions are described below:
• Watermark data source - This block is adopted from the data source block in the
DBPSK transmitter program and applies the same packet format to organize
watermark data into packets with preamble, access code, and CRC check fields.
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• Byte coordinator - This block unpacks watermark data bytes into bits, and
concatenates a designated number of bits to form new bytes for embedding.
• Watermark embedding - This block reads output from the byte coordinator, and
embeds the byte value into the PN sequence according to specific embedding
methods.
If the sub-sequence method is used, this block constructs a table corresponding
to the section for the designated number of chips to flip in Table V, at the
block establishment stage. During the block operation stage, each iteration
of the watermark embedding process starts with one copy of the original PN
sequence and one incoming byte. The incoming byte is divided into bit groups
corresponding to each sub-sequence. The value of each bit group is then added
to the starting position of its sub-sequence to obtain a chip position. The chip
at this location is then flipped in the copy of the PN sequence. After all bit
groups in one byte are processed and all of the designated chips are flipped,
the modified PN sequence copy is sent to the DSSS modulator for subsequent
processing.
If the maximized distance method is used, this block constructs a table similar
to Table IV at the block establishment stage. During the block operation stage,
each iteration of the watermark embedding process starts with one incoming
byte. The value of the incoming byte is used as the table index to fetch the
corresponding modified PN sequences. The modified PN sequence copy is then
sent to the DSSS modulator for subsequent processing.
Processing blocks for the WDSSS receiver are shown in Figure 14. Their func-
tions are described below:
• DSSS demodulator - This block add one more step to the original DSSS correla-
tion process. After a differential encoded bit is successfully recovered, the group
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Figure 13: WDSSS System Transmitter Flow Graph: blocks in bold boxes represent
additional WDSSS processing blocks added to the generic DSSS system
of incoming bits corresponding to that bit are sent to the watermark extraction
processor.
• Watermark extraction - This block also performs watermark extraction accord-
ing to specific embedding methods.
If the sub-sequence method is used, this block constructs a table corresponding
to the section for the expected number of chip errors in Table V, at the block
establishment stage. During the block operation stage, each iteration of the wa-
termark extraction process compares the incoming bits with the PN sequence
to find the positions of flipped chips. Each flipped chip position is compared
with the starting position of the corresponding sub-sequence, and the difference
is then represented by a group of bits, which contains the same number of bits
as required by the sub-sequence. After all positions of the flipped chips are
processed, the bit groups are packed together to form an extracted byte, which
is sent to the byte coordinator for subsequent processing.
If the maximized distance method is used, this block constructs a table simi-
lar to Table IV at the block establishment stage. During the block operation
stage, each iteration of the watermark extraction process counts the Hamming
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Figure 14: WDSSS System Receiver Flow Graph: blocks in bold boxes represent
additional WDSSS processing to the generic DSSS system
distances between the incoming bits and every stored modified PN sequence,
and compares the Hamming distances to get the sequence with the minimum
distance to the incoming bits. The distance is then compared to a threshold to
decide whether it is acceptable. If the result is acceptable, the table index of
the corresponding PN sequence is the extracted byte, which is sent to the byte
coordinator for subsequent processing.
• Byte coordinator - This block unpacks and packs bytes in the order reverse
to that of its counterpart in the transmitter. It unpacks the value part of the
extracted bytes into a designated number of bits, and packs every 8 bits to form
one watermark data byte.
• Watermark data sink - This block is adopted from the frame sink block in
the DBPSK receiver program. It correlates the byte stream with the known
preamble and access code to reconstruct packets, and inspects packets with
CRC32 to determine whether the packets are correct.
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CHAPTER V
PERFORMANCE STUDY
This chapter first explains the experimental setup, and then analyzes the ex-
pected theoretical PER performance of the content signal and the watermark signal,
which is compared with the experimental results.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The transmitter and receiver programs of the WDSSS prototype system are in-
stalled separately on two HP Compaq 8000 Elite desktop computers. Both computers
are running Ubuntu 11.04 as the operating system with GNU Radio 3.4.2 installed.
Two USRP2s are used as the front-ends and each device is connected to one of the two
desktop computers via a Gigabit Ethernet cable. Each USRP2 is equipped with one
RFX 1200 daughterboard and one VERT400 antenna, supporting a carrier frequency
range of 1150 to 1450 MHz. The two USRP2s are placed about 10 feet away from
each other. In addition, an Agilent N9000A CXA Signal Analyzer is used to observe
the signal spectrum.
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Both the transmitter and the receiver can choose the operating mode as DBPSK,
DSSS or WDSSS. For the WDSSS mode, chip flipping options are 1-chip, 2-chip, 3-
chip and 4-chip for flipping 1 chip, 2 chips, 3 chips and 4 chips of the original PN
sequence, respectively. The PN sequence used in these experiments is the 11-chip
Barker Sequence.
All experiments were run at a center frequency of 1200MHz, with a content
data rate of 100K bits per second. The parameter of samples per symbol is set to
5. When the system is running in DBPSK mode, the resulting sample rate is 500K
Hz, and hence the interpolation rate or the decimation rate for USRP2 is 200. If the
operating mode is DSSS or WDSSS, the DBPSK signal is spread with the 11-chip
Barker Sequence, yielding a sample rate of 5.5M Hz. Because 5.5M is not a factor of
the DAC/ADC sample rate of the USRP2, which is 100M Hz, the program calculates
an interpolation rate and a decimation rate as 16, producing a sample rate of 6.25M
Hz for the interface between the USRP2 and GNU Radio, and applies a rational
resampler to handle the sample rate conversion.
In the transmitter program, the data sources of the content signal and water-
mark signal are two different binary files. The amplitude of the transmitted signal
was tuned to values in the range of [0.002, 0.012] to simulate varying SNR values.
This range of values is chosen, because the PER for all chip flipping option is 100%
when the amplitude is below 0.002, and the PER approximates 0% when the ampli-
tude is above 0.015. The corresponding SNR values are obtained from the measured
results of the signal analyzer. Based on observations through the signal analyzer, the
noise floor is shown at -96 dbm, the discernible minimum signal power is -92 dbm
for the amplitude of 0.005, and the readings increase in logarithmic scale when the
amplitude is increased. Therefore, the SNR value corresponding to each amplitude
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value can be calculated with the equation:
SNR = (−92− (−96)) + 20 log(amplitude
0.005
) (5.1)
which yields the range for SNR values as [-4, 12] dB, and the incremental step for
tuning the amplitude is set to approximately 1 dB.
In the receiver program, the two decoding thresholds for the correlation oper-
ation in the DSSS modulator are set to 4 and 7 for bit value of 0 and 1, respectively,
in order to accommodate with flipping of up to 4 chips.
5.2 Spectrum Analysis
The first object of this batch of experiments is to compare the spectrum of
the DBPSK signal with or without the spreading operation to verify the spreading
effect of the DSSS system. The spreading effect should be demonstrated in the DSSS
signal with expanded bandwidth and a reduced power spectra density compared to
the DBPSK signal without spreading. The bandwidth expansion ratio of the spread
signal to the original signal in a DSSS system is called the processing gain, and it is
equal to the length of the PN sequence. The processing gain is also applied to the
power spectra density reduction ratio of the spread signal to the original signal.
In this experiment, the length of the PN sequence is 11, so the processing gain
is 11, and the bandwidth expansion ratio should be 11 accordingly. In terms of the
reduction ratio, because it is shown as a logarithmic scale in the spectrum analyzer
display, the amount of reduced power spectra density in dB should be 10 log 11 or
10.41dB.
The measured result from the signal analyzer is shown in Figure 15. Trace 1
is the spectrum of the DBPSK signal without spreading, and the value of Marker 1
records the peak value of the spectrum. Trace 2 is the spectrum of the DSSS signal,
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Figure 15: Spectrum Comparison between the DBPSK Signal without Spreading and
the DSSS Signal
and the value of Marker 2 records the peak value of the spectrum. The bandwidth
of the DSSS signal is approximately 11 times that of the DBPSK signal without
spreading, and the peak value of the DSSS signal is 10.25 dB less than that of the
DBPSK signal without spreading. Both results are close to expected results.
The second spectrum comparison is between the DSSS signal without water-
mark and the WDSSS signals with all options of chip flipping. Carrying embedded
watermark data bits in the flipped chips does not require extra bandwidth, and hence,
the spectra of the WDSSS signals with various flipped chips should have the same
bandwidth and same power spectra density as the spectrum of the DSSS signal. Mea-
surements from the signal analyzer in Figure 16 show the expected results. Trace 1
and Marker 1 belong to the DSSS signal without watermark. Trace 2 though 5 and
Marker 2 through 5 are the spectra measurements for the WDSSS signals with flip-
ping option of 1-chip, 2-chip, 3-chip and 4-chip, respectively. All traces and markers
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Figure 16: Spectrum Comparison among the DSSS Signal and the WDSSS Signals
with different chip flipping options
overlap.
5.3 WDSSS Content Signal Performance
Performance of a digital communication system is usually evaluated by bit
error rate (BER). The BER of the WDSSS content signal is related to the BER of the
underlying DSSS signal. This paper implemented the DSSS spreading operation after
the differential encoding in the transmitter, and placed the DSSS correlation process
before the differential decoding in the receiver, therefore, the actual transmitted and
received signal is modulated and demodulated with BPSK. The BER of BPSK is [26]:
PBPSK = Q(
√
2εb
N0
) = Q(
√
2SNR) (5.2)
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which determines the DSSS decoding error probability P by treating the PN sequence
as a block code of length n [11] using the equation [26]:
P =
n∑
i=t+1
P (i, n) (5.3)
where t is the DSSS decoding threshold, P (i, n) is the probability of i errors in a
block code of length n:
P (i, n) =
(
n
i
)
PBPSK
i(1− PBPSK)(n−i) (5.4)
Because the implementation of DSSS involves 2 thresholds to determine bit
value 0 and 1 individually, when the number of errors falls between the two thresholds,
the DSSS decoding error is taken to be approximately 50%. Thus, the DSSS decoding
error probability P can be estimated as:
P = [
t1−1∑
i=t0+1
P (i, n)]/2 +
n∑
i=t1
P (i, n) (5.5)
where t0 and t1 are the two DSSS decoding thresholds for bit value 0 and 1, respec-
tively.
The DSSS decoding error probability in turn is used to estimate the differential
decoding error probability, which is the BER of the DSSS signal:
PDSSS = 2P (1− P ) (5.6)
The BER of the WDSSS content signal can be calculated from separate con-
siderations for the two parts of the original PN sequence, the flipped part and the
non-flipped part. The flipped part contains the artificial chip errors and hence ef-
fects the DSSS decoding error probability differently. If the artificial chip errors are
received correctly, they increase the DSSS decoding error probability. On the other
hand, if they are corrupted when received, they do not effect the DSSS decoding error
probability. Because the DSSS decoding error still occurs when the total chip errors
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exceed the DSSS decoding threshold t, the new decoding error probability P
′
for a
flipping option of c-chip is:
P
′
=
c∑
i=0
[P (i, c)×
n−c∑
j=(t+1)−(c−i)
P (n− c, j)] (5.7)
Similarly, the P
′
can be estimated more accurately with consideration for the number
of errors falling between two thresholds, by combining (5.5) and (5.7).
Therefore, the BER of the WDSSS content signal is:
PWDSSS = 2P
′
(1− P ′) (5.8)
In order to be consistent with the measured experimental results, the theoret-
ical BER is converted into packet error rate (PER):
PER = 1− (1−BER)8s (5.9)
where s is the packet size in bytes, which is set to 1520 in experiments of this paper.
The theoretical PERs of the DSSS signal and WDSSS content signals with various
chip flipping options are plotted in Figure 17. To maintain PER less than 10% [12],
the required SNR increases 1.25 dB for 1-chip flipping, increases another 1.5 dB for
2-chip flipping, increases another 2 dB for 3-chip flipping, and increases another 3.1
dB for 4-chip flipping. On average, the extra SNR required for each additional flipped
chip is 1.96 dB.
Experimental results corresponding to the theoretical analysis are shown in
Figure 18. Because the estimated SNR values used in the experiments are different
from the actual SNR values from the USRP2 platform, there is approximately 2 dB
SNR difference between the theoretical results and the experimental results. Except
for this SNR offset, the experimental results show that to maintain the acceptable
10% PER, the required SNR increases 1.45 dB for 1-chip flipping, increases another
1.85 dB for 2-chip flipping, increases another 2.4 dB for 3-chip flipping, and increases
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Figure 17: Theoretical PER of DSSS Signal and WDSSS Content Signals
Figure 18: Experimental PER of DSSS Signal and WDSSS Content Signals
another 2.25 dB for 4-chip flipping. On average, the extra SNR required for each
additional flipped chip is 1.99 dB, which is similar to the theoretical result.
5.4 WDSSS Watermark Signal Performance
The performance of WDSSS watermark signal was evaluated in terms of PER
and throughput, and compared among various chip flipping options as well as between
the two embedding methods.
5.4.1 With Various Flipping Settings
To measure the WDSSS watermark signal with various chip flipping options,
the sub-sequence method shown in Table V is used. Because the sub-sequence embed-
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Figure 19: PER of WDSSS Watermark Signal with Various Flipping Settings
ding method dose not provide error correcting capability for the watermark signal,
the BER of the WDSSS watermark signal is equal to the BER of BPSK modulation.
PER is then calculated from BER with equation (5.9). Figure 19 shows the calculated
BPSK PER and the measured PER for the WDSSS watermark signal. The measured
PER with various chip flipping options overlap each other. Except for the 2 dB SNR
offset, the measured PER matched the calculated PER.
As shown in Table V, various chip flipping options provide different embedding
capabilities, which lead to different throughput for the WDSSS watermark signal.
With embedding capability w, and content data rate R, the throughput of the WDSSS
watermark signal can be calculated as:
Throughput = (1− PER)× w ×R (5.10)
The measured throughput for WDSSS watermark signals with various chip
flipping options is shown in Figure 20. With adequate SNR, 2-chip flipping embeds
33% more than 1-chip flipping; 3-chip and 4-chip flipping embed 67% more than 1-
chip flipping, and 25% more than 2-chip flipping. Comparing this result with the
previous PER result of the WDSSS content signal, there exists a trade-off between
the performance of the content signal and the throughput of the watermark signal.
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Figure 20: Throughput of WDSSS Watermark Signal with Various Flipping Settings
5.4.2 With Different Embedding Methods
In this batch of experiments, 3-chip flipping option is used with the two embed-
ding methods. The sub-sequence dividing scheme is the same as in the Table V, and
the set of modified PN sequences used in the maximized minimum distance method
is shown in Table IV. Therefore, the BER for the sub-sequence method is still equal
to the BER of BPSK. On the other hand, since the maximized minimum distance
method offers error correcting capability to the watermark signal, the BER for the
maximized minimum distance method is calculated from equation (5.3), where t is
calculated as t = b(dmin − 1)/2c. The converted PER is plotted in Figure 21, which
shows that 4 dB less SNR is required for the maximized minimum distance method
to maintain PER less than 10%. The measured results are shown in Figure 22, which
shows that 3 dB less SNR is required for the maximized minimum distance method
to maintain PER less than 10%, with 1 dB SNR difference to the theoretical analysis.
The measured throughput for the WDSSS watermark signal with different
embedding methods is shown in Figure 23. With adequate SNR, the sub-sequence
method can provide 400% more throughput with adequate SNR.
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Figure 21: Theoretical PER of WDSSS Watermark Signal with Different Embedding
Methods
Figure 22: Experimental PER of WDSSS Watermark Signal with Different Embed-
ding Methods
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Figure 23: Throughput of WDSSS Watermark Signal with Different Embedding
Methods
58
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis proposed a watermarked DSSS (WDSSS) technique. The WDSSS
technique flips chips on designated positions in the PN sequence to convey authenti-
cation information, and hence provides additional physical layer security to the DSSS
system without requiring extra bandwidth. This thesis also developed a WDSSS
prototype system on the GNU Radio/USRP SDR platform and presented theoreti-
cal analysis and experimental results for the performances of the content signal and
watermark signal.
Experimental results verified the theoretical analysis and demonstrated the
fundamental functions of the WDSSS technique. The impact of flipped chips to the
performance of content signal was quantitatively measured, and indicated that, for the
11-chip PN sequence, an approximate 2 dB extra SNR is required for each additional
flipped chip. On the other hand, increasing number of flipped chips provides increased
throughput for the watermark signal. Two different watermark embedding methods
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were implemented, with different embedding capability and different error correcting
capability. The maximized minimum distance method outperformed the sub-sequence
method in terms of PER with 3 dB improvement, while the sub-sequence method
provided up to 400% extra channel capacity for the watermark signal in an optimal
communication environment. The trade-off between the robustness of the watermark
signal and the capacity of the watermark channel implies that watermark embedding
methods with different strengths can be customized for different levels of security
requirements.
6.2 Future Work
Considering that the performance of the WDSSS system is closely related to the
channel quality, an adaptive chip flipping scheme can be designed to balance content
signal quality and the watermark signal throughput. For example, according to the
experimental results in Figure 18, when 1% PER degradation can be tolerated and
measured SNR is larger than 3.5 dB, 1-chip watermark can be used; when measured
SNR increases to 5 dB, then 2-chip watermark can be used; and so forth. If the
measured SNR dropped back to 3 dB, then no watermark can be used.
With this scheme, chip flipping options rise when channel quality reaches a set
of thresholds, and reduces when channel quality deteriorates. At the communication
setup stage, the transmitter and the receiver can establish an agreement on a set
of thresholds by using public key or other security scheme. First the watermark
signal is generated according to the current SNR value and the threshold. During
the information exchange stage, both sides keep monitoring the channel quality and
adjust the chip flipping option accordingly. There can be a transition period between
two different chip flipping options when a SNR variance is observed, the receiver will
continue to use the previous chip flipping option to decode incoming signals, and at
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the same time, save the incoming signal into a buffer. If the watermark decoding
process fails continuously for a certain number of samples, the new chip flipping
option is put in use.
When chip flipping option is managed in this way, the watermark signal gives
priority to the content signal when the channel quality is suboptimal, so that the sys-
tem performance can be maintained at an acceptable level. On the other hand, when
the channel quality is excellent, more chips can be flipped so that more watermark
data bits can be embedded, and hence the capacity of the watermark channel can be
fully utilized.
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